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Free-space quantum key distribution
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A working free-space quantum key distribution (QKD)
system has been developed and tested over a 205-m indoor
optical path at Los Alamos National Laboratory under fluo-
rescent lighting conditions. Results show that free-space QKD
can provide secure real-time key distribution between parties
who have a need to communicate secretly.
PACS Numbers: 42.79.Sz, 03.65-w
Quantum cryptography was introduced in the mid-
1980s [1] as a new method for generating the shared,
secret random number sequences, or cryptographic keys,
that are used in crypto-systems to provide communi-
cations security. The appeal of quantum cryptography
is that its security is based on laws of Nature, in con-
trast to existing methods of key distribution that derive
their security from the perceived intractability of certain
problems in number theory, or from the physical secu-
rity of the distribution process. Since the introduction
of quantum cryptography, several groups have demon-
strated that quantum key distribution (QKD) can be
performed over multi-kilometer distances of optical fiber
[2]- [9], but the utility of the method would be greatly en-
hanced if it could also be performed over free-space paths,
such as are used in laser communications systems. Indeed
there are certain key distribution problems in this cate-
gory for which QKD would have definite practical advan-
tages (for example, it is impractical to send a courier to
a satellite). We are developing QKD for use over line-of-
sight paths, including surface to satellite, and here we re-
port our first results on key generation over indoor paths
of up to 205 m.
The feasibility of QKD over free-space paths might be
considered problematic because it requires the transmis-
sion of single photons through a medium with varying
properties and detection of these photons against a high
background. However, others have shown that the combi-
nation of sub-nanosecond timing, narrow filters [10,11],
and spatial filtering can render both of these problems
tractable. Furthermore, the atmosphere is essentially
non-birefringent at optical wavelengths, allowing faith-
ful transmission of the single-photon polarization states
used in QKD.
A QKD procedure starts with the sender, “Alice,” gen-
erating a secret random binary number sequence. For
each bit in the sequence, Alice prepares and transmits
a single photon to the recipient, “Bob,” who measures
each arriving photon and attempts to identify the bit
value Alice has transmitted. Alice’s photon state prepa-
rations and Bob’s measurements are chosen from sets of
non-orthogonal possibilities. For example, in the B92
protocol [12] Alice agrees with Bob (through public dis-
cussion) that she will transmit a horizontally-polarized
photon, |h〉, for each “0” in her sequence, and a right-
circular-polarized photon, |rcp〉, for each “1” in her se-
quence. Bob agrees with Alice to randomly test the po-
larization of each arriving photon in one of two ways: he
either tests with vertical polarization, |v〉, to reveal “1s,”
or left-circular polarization, |lcp〉, to reveal “0s.” Note
that Bob will never detect a photon for which he and Al-
ice have used a preparation/measurement pair that cor-
responds to different bit values, such as |h〉 and |v〉, which
happens for 50% of the bits in Alice’s sequence. However,
for the other 50% of Alice’s bits where the preparation
and measurement protocols agree, such as |h〉 and |lcp〉,
there is a 50% probability that Bob detects the photon, as
shown in TABLE I. So, by detecting photons Bob is able
to identify a random 25% portion of the bits in Alice’s
sequence, assuming no bit loss in transmission or detec-
tion. (This 25% efficiency factor is the price that Alice
and Bob must pay for secrecy.) Bob then communicates
to Alice over a public channel the locations, but not the
bit values, in the sequence where he detected photons,
and Alice retains only these detected bits from her initial
sequence. The resulting detected bit sequences are the
raw key material from which a pure key is distilled using
classical error detection techniques. An eavesdropper,
“Eve,” can neither “tap” the key transmissions, owing
to the indivisibility of a photon [13,14], nor copy them
owing to the quantum “no-cloning” [15]- [18] theorem.
Furthermore, the non-orthogonal nature of the quantum
states ensures that if Eve makes her own measurements
she will be detected through the elevated error rate she
causes by the irreversible “collapse of the wavefunction”
[19].
The prototype QKD transmitter (FIG. 1) consisted of
a temperature controlled diode laser, a collimating lens,
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two dielectric mirrors, a fiber to free-space launch system,
a single-mode fiber pigtailed polarization neutral beam-
splitter, a variable optical attenuator (OA), a ∼ 10-m
single-mode optical fiber delay, a 2.5 nm bandwidth in-
terference filter (IF), a polarizing beamsplitter (PBS), a
low-voltage pockels cell (PC), and an 8× beam expander
(BE).
The diode laser wavelength is temperature selected to
772 nm, and the laser is configured to emit a short, weak
coherent pulse of∼ 1 ns length, containing approximately
105 photons.
The free-space QKD receiver (FIG. 2) was comprised
of a 3.5 in. Cassegrain telescope (CT), a free-space to
fiber launch system, a single-mode fiber pigtailed polar-
ization neutral beamsplitter, two sets of polarization con-
trollers (each consisting of a quarter-wave retarder and a
half-wave retarder), a PBS, and a single photon count-
ing module, or SPCM (EG&G part number: SPCM-AQ
142-FL). The prototype receiver did not include an in-
terference filter but it is expected that future versions of
the receiver will incorporate this feature to reduce back-
ground light levels.
A computer control system, “Alice,” starts the QKD
protocol by pulsing the diode laser at a rate previously
agreed upon between herself and the receiving computer
control system, “Bob.” Each laser pulse is launched into
a single-mode optical fiber and then split by the beam-
splitter with equal probability between the direct path
and the delay path. The direct path produces a coherent
“bright pulse” of ∼ 105 photons which Bob uses as his
system trigger for timing purposes.
Light traveling along the direct path passes through
the IF, the PBS, the PC, and is then launched into free-
space from the BE. The IF constrains wavelength, and
the PBS is oriented to transmit horizontal polarization.
The fiber delay and OA are used to delay the diverted
pulse by ∼ 50 ns as well as attenuate the diverted pulse
to an average of ∼ 1.4 photons per pulse. This atten-
uated pulse then impinges again upon the beamsplit-
ter, which transmits a dim-pulse with and average of
∼ 0.7 photons that follows the bright pulse along the
direct path through the IF, the PBS, the PC, and the
BE. (The attenuated pulse only approximates a “single-
photon” state; we tested out the system with an average
of ∼ 0.7 photons per “dim-pulse.” This corresponds to a
2-photon probability of ∼ 12% and implies that ∼ 30%
of the detectable dim-pulses will contain 2 or more pho-
tons, e.g., with a Poisson distribution with an average
photon number of 0.7 there will be ∼ 50 empty sets,
∼ 35 sets of 1 photon, ∼ 12 sets of 2 photons, and ∼ 3
sets of 3 photons for every 100 dim-pulses.) The PBS
transmits the |h〉 dim-pulse to the PC which is randomly
switched to affect only the dim-pulse polarization. The
random switch setting is determined by discriminating a
random voltage generated by a white noise source and
either passes the dim-pulse unchanged as |h〉 (zero-wave
retardation) or changes it to |rcp〉 (quarter-wave retar-
dation), depending on the random bit value. The bright
pulse’s polarization is never altered.
Bob then collects the bright- and dim-pulses with the
Cassegrain telescope and launches them into single-mode
fiber. The bright pulse is split at the beamsplitter along
two independent paths—one path [the long path (LP)] is
approximately 5 ns longer than the other path [the short
path (SP)]. Each path contains polarization controlling
optics which terminate upon the PBS. We configured our
system to operate with a single SPCM, but we have also
operated with SPCMs at both of the output ports of the
PBS.
If the dim-pulse of ∼ 0.7 photons is collected and
launched into the fiber at the receiver it will be diverted
by the beamsplitter with equal probability along one of
the two possible optical paths. In the prototype system
the polarization controlling optics were adjusted to be-
have together as a quarter-wave retarder along the SP,
and a zero-wave retarder along the LP. Thus, a dim-pulse
of |rcp〉 traveling the SP is converted to |v〉 and reflected
away from the SPCM. Conversely, a dim-pulse of |h〉
traveling the SP is converted to |rcp〉 and is transmit-
ted toward or reflected away from the SPCM with equal
probability. Similarly, a dim-pulse of |h〉 traveling the
LP is transmitted away from the SPCM, but a dim-pulse
of |rcp〉 is reflected toward or transmitted away from the
SPCM with equal probability.
We used the differing path lengths, together with fast
timing electronics gated with narrow coincidence win-
dows (∼ 5 ns), to determine dim-pulse polarizations with
a single detector. Specifically, a coincidence observed 50
ns after the bright pulse (early coincidence) informs Bob
that the dim-pulse was of |rcp〉, while a coincidence ob-
served 55 ns after the bright pulse (late coincidence) tells
Bob that the dim-pulse was of |h〉. The detector dead
time was ∼ 35 ns.
A variety of transmitter and receiver configurations
were used to evaluate the equipment and test out the
optical elements over optical path lengths of 2-, 36-, and
205-m, but here we discuss only the 205-m results. The
205-m experiment was performed with the transmitter
and receiver colocated in order to simplify data acquisi-
tion. The 205-m optical path was achieved by sending
the emitted beam up and down a ∼ 17.1-m laboratory
hallway 6 times with the use of 10 mirrors, and a corner
cube under fluorescent lighting conditions.
The corner cube was used to determine the feasibil-
ity of transmitting single photons from a ground station
to a low earth orbit satellite covered with corner cubes
(such as LAGEOS-I and LAGEOS-II) and back. (Note:
the primary property of the corner cube is its ability to
return light back along the path it came. However, the
corner cube also possesses the seldom-noted feature that
each of its 6 possible optical paths will transform a given
incident polarization differently [20]. Because of this, a
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fully illuminated corner cube cannot be used to perform
polarization dependent experiments. Therefore, only one
path through the corner cube was used during the exper-
iment.)
The coupling efficiency, η, between the transmitter and
receiver for the 205-m path was η ∼ 2%, where η accounts
for losses between the transmitter and the power coupled
into the single-mode fibers preceding the detector at the
receiver. This efficiency led to a bit-rate of ∼ 50 Hz when
the transmitter was pulsed at a rate of ∼ 20 kHz over
the 205-m path, with the system operating at an average
of ∼ 0.7 photons per dim-pulse. The final bit-rate is the
product of η and the probabilities that the weak coherent
pulse of photons will reach the detector, and the probabil-
ities that the detector will fire when Poisson distributed
photons reach the detector. [The detector efficiency is
a function of the average photon number per dim-pulse,
and accounts for the probability the detector will fire
given 1 photon (p(1) ∼ 0.65), 2 photons (p(2) ∼ 0.878),
3 photons (p(3) ∼ 0.957), etc., reach the detector. These
probabilities are convolved with the probabilities that 1,
2, 3, or more of those photons actually reach the detec-
tor and then convolved with the Poisson probabilities for
1, 2, 3, or more photons per dim-pulse (p(1) = 0.348,
p(2) ∼ 0.123, p(3) ∼ 0.0284, etc.). These convolutions
are then summed to give the detection efficiency as a
function of the Poisson average photon number.] The bit
error rate (BER) for the 205-m path was ∼ 6%, where
the BER is defined as the ratio of the bits received in er-
ror to the total number of bits received. A sample of raw
key material from the 205-m experiment, with errors, is
shown in TABLE II.
The narrow coincidence time windows in Bob’s receiver
minimized bit errors due to detector dark noise (∼ 80
Hz); the ambient background was ∼ 1 kHz. These low
noise rates amounted to ∼ 1 bit-error every 9 s. After-
pulsing of the SPCMs caused by the bright pulses con-
tributed ∼ 2% to the total BER—an average rate of 1
bit-error per second. In addition, bright pulse reflections
within the transmitter caused the “1s” errors (late coin-
cidence errors) to be about 6 times higher than the “0s”
errors (early coincidence). After-pulsing errors could be
reduced by increasing the length of the fiber delay to
further separate the bright and dim pulse and should re-
sult in a BER of ∼ 4%—an average rate of 2 bit-errors
per second; reflection errors could be reduced through
the use of angle polished fiber termination and should
result in a BER of ∼ 2%. It is important to eliminate re-
flection errors because these are weaknesses which could
be exploited by Eve. The BER might be further re-
duced to ∼ 1% by elimination of the common PBS at
the receiver, and by operating the receiver in a 2 detec-
tor configuration. The poor coupling efficiency (η ∼ 2%)
together with the constant average bit-errors caused by
after-pulsing and reflections (about 3 bit-errors per sec-
ond) prevented us from effectively operating the proto-
type system below an average of ∼ 0.7 photons per dim-
pulse.
This experiment implemented a two-dimensional par-
ity check scheme which allowed the generation of error
free key material. The error detection program permit-
ted the isolation of error free bits from key material with
BERs exceeding 10%. A further stage of “privacy am-
plification” is necessary to reduce any partial knowledge
gained by an eavesdropper to less than 1-bit of infor-
mation [21]. We have not implemented this protocol at
this time. Our prototype incorporates a “one time pad1”
[22] encryption (also known as the Vernam Cipher)—the
only provably secure encryption method, and could also
support any other symmetric key system.
The original form of the B92 protocol [12] has a weak-
ness to a “man-in-the middle,” or opaque, attack by Eve.
For instance, Eve could measure Alice’s photons in Bob’s
basis and only send a photon, or coherent photon pulse,
when she identifies a bit. However, if Eve retransmits
each observed bit as a single-photon (or a weak coherent
pulse) she will noticeably lower Bob’s bit-rate. To com-
pensate for the additional attenuation to Bob’s bit-rate
Eve could send on a coherent photon pulse of an intensity
appropriate to raise Bob’s bit-rate to a level similar to
her own bit-rate with Alice. [In fact, if Eve sends a bright
classical pulse (a pulse of a large average photon number)
she guarantees that Bob’s bit-rate is equal to her own.]
Our system protects against this scenario when operated
with two SPCMs. For example, this type of attack would
be revealed by an increase in “dual-fire” errors which oc-
cur when both SPCMs fire simultaneously. (In a perfect
system there would be no “dual-fire” errors, regardless of
the average photon number per pulse, but in an imperfect
experimental system, where bit-errors occur, dual-fire er-
rors will occur.) A better protection would be to use the
BB84 [1] protocol, which our system also supports.
Over the next few months we intend to implement de-
sign changes to the transmitter and receiver in order to
increase system efficiency, η, and increase the total range
of the QKD system. Our calculations show that a nar-
row filter, the spatial filtering and the narrow coincidence
timing provided by this system will allow reliable key dis-
tribution under bright daylight conditions. Our goal is
to exchange key bits outdoors over one or two kilometers
by the end of 1997.
Finally, we note that somewhat similar results to these
presented here are reported in reference [23]. However,
1One time pad encryption utilizes a unique random string of
key bits to encrypt a single plaintext message. In particular,
the key bit string exactly the same length as the plaintext
string and is used only one time. Encryption (decryption) is
accomplished by XORing the message bits (encrypted bits)
with the key bits.
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the protocol of reference [23] was implemented with a
modulated HeNe laser, utilized long pulse lengths (∼ 100
ns), and active polarization switching at the receiver,
whereas we implemented our protocol over a line-of-sight
path 35% longer than in reference [23] with a system
which incorporates short pulse lengths (∼ 1 ns, and al-
lows the use of narrow coincidence timing windows to
minimize ambient background noise allowing daytime ap-
plications) and passive polarization switching at the re-
ceiver (a simpler design than in reference [23] which will
be critical for the locating of a receiver, Bob, on a satel-
lite).
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TABLE I. Observation Probabilities
Alice’s Bit Value “0” “0” “1” “1”
Bob Tests With “1” “0” “1” “0”
Observation Probability p= 0 p= 1
2
p= 1
2
p= 0
TABLE II. A 200-Bit Sample of Alice’s (A) and Bob’s (B)
Raw Key Material Generated by Free-Space QKD
A 11111010 10100100 00110010 10011011 01010110
B 11111011 11100000 00111010 10011011 01010110
A 00111101 01101111 11010000 01101111 01011011
B 00111101 01101111 11010000 01101111 01011011
A 11100100 01010001 10110100 10110101 01101011
B 11100100 01010001 00010100 10110101 01101011
A 10001011 11010111 10101110 10100111 00010011
B 00001001 11010111 10101010 10100111 00010011
A 01000010 00100011 00111001 01101100 01110001
B 01000010 00100011 00111001 01101000 01110001
PBS
IF PC
OA
Delay
BS
Cooled
Laser
BE
FIG. 1. Free-Space QKD Transmitter (Alice).
PBS
SPCM BS
Delay
CT
POLARIZATION CONTROLLERS
FIG. 2. Free-Space QKD Receiver (Bob).
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